The plurality seems to place some reliance on the police officer's reaction to respondent's question. ." "If the individual states, that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." In any event, as the Oregon Court of Appeals noted, the officer clearly took advantage of respondent's inquiry to commence once again his questioning -- a practice squarely at odds with Edwards. You also agree to abide by our. [Footnote 4] Courts should engage in more substantive inquiries than "who said what first." Pp. See, e. g., McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797 (CA8 1982) (defendant initiated reinterrogation by knocking on cell door and telling police officer that he wanted to make a statement); United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478 (CA2 1981) (defendant reopened dialogue by expressing a desire to provide information about someone else who should also be arrested); State v. Brezee, 66 Haw. Only then did he confess. Because, in my view, the plurality has misapplied Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477 (1981), I respectfully dissent. . ", "initiated" conversation with the police "in the ordinary dictionary sense of the word." Both Justices agree in one respect. The significance of the invocation of the right to counsel is premised in part on a lawyer's "unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation." We recently found it necessary to clarify uncertainty that had resulted from decisions of this Court that had undertaken, in Fourth Amendment cases, to draw lines that were too refined to be applied consistently. This is made clear in the following footnote to our Edwards opinion: "If, as frequently would occur in the course of a meeting initiated by the accused, the conversation is not wholly one-sided, it is likely that the officers will say or do something that clearly would be 'interrogation.' In my concurring opinion in Ross, I said it was "essential to have a Court opinion . .
JUSTICE REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE O'CONNOR joined. In this case, respondent invoked his right to have counsel during custodial interrogation. As evidenced by the differing readings of Edwards by JUSTICES MARSHALL and REHNQUIST in their respective opinions, my hope has not been fully realized.
. Since Justice MARSHALL concludes that Bradshaw had not initiated the dialogue, he does not consider the subsequent facts and circumstances that were found by the trial court to satisfy the Zerbst standard. Argued March 28, 1983. We held that subsequent incriminating statements made without his attorney present violated the rights secured to the defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In my view, Edwards unambiguously established such a rule. 949, 953, 636 P.2d 1011, 1013 (1981). ", he is surely responding to his custodial surroundings. App. 490, 497, 433 A.2d 1195, 1199 (1981) (Edwards does not create per se rule); State v. Scott, 626 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981) (applying "totality of the circumstances" test, rather than per se rule). The court held that the statements made to the polygraph examiner were voluntary, and the result of a knowing waiver of his right to remain silent. It was immediately followed by a renewal of Miranda warnings and additional conversation. Maryland Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1039 (1983), List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 462, https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Oregon_v._Bradshaw&oldid=895901280, United States Supreme Court cases of the Burger Court, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License, Rehnquist, joined by Burger, White, O'Connor, Marshall, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, This page was last edited on 7 May 2019, at 05:55. [Footnote 1] My hope had been that this case would afford an opportunity to clarify the confusion. To hold otherwise would drastically undermine the safeguards that Miranda and Edwards carefully erected around the right to counsel in the custodial setting. Since our decision in Edwards, the lower courts have had no difficulty in identifying such situations. Respondent again denied his involvement, and said "I do want an attorney before it goes very. 462 U. S. 1045-10466. The authorities may then communicate with him through an attorney. Pennsylvania See 54 Or.App., at 953, 636 P.2d, at 1013. The Oregon Court of Appeals, relying on our decision in Edwards v. Arizona, supra, reversed. Ante at 462 U. S. 1043. 1982) (defendant asked for a meeting with police at which statements were made); People v. Thomas, 98 Ill. App.
Once at the station, respondent was advised of his rights as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. Although ambiguous, the respondent's question in this case as to what was going to happen to him evinced a willingness. . Thus, the Oregon Court of Appeals was wrong in thinking that an "initiation" of a conversation or discussion by an accused not only satisfied the Edwards rule, but ex proprio vigore sufficed to show a waiver of the previously asserted right to counsel. The only dispute between the plurality and the dissent in this case concerns the meaning of "initiation" for purposes of Edwards' per se rule. concluding that the statements had been obtained in violation of respondent's Fifth Amendment rights. Cf. Indeed, the Oregon court's decision contains lengthy quotations from Edwards.
A conversation then followed in which the officer suggested his theory of how Bradshaw had caused Reynolds' death and then suggested that Bradshaw take a lie detector test to clear things up. Eighth Circuit You have requested an attorney and I don't want you talking to me unless you so desire because anything you say—because—since you have requested an attorney, you know, it has to be at your own free will.' Hence, if the accused himself approaches the police, this suggests that the accused may not be being badgered, so that when the police respond to the accused's queries with questions of their own, a reviewing court can decide, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether the accused had waived his Fifth Amendment rights during interrogation. Under this view of the two-step analysis, a court never gets to the second step -- however relevant subsequent facts and circumstances may be to a waiver -- unless the accused was the first to speak and to say the right thing.
much further." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 451 U.S. at 451 U. S. 484-485 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). As evidenced by the differing readings of Edwards by JUSTICES MARSHALL and REHNQUIST in their respective opinions, my hope has not been fully realized. Either just before or during his trip from Rockaway to Tillamook, respondent inquired of a police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" If a suspect is not inviting further questioning about the criminal case at hand, he is not acceding to further "interrogation" as Edwards and Miranda contemplated.